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NOTES
WHEN A CREDITOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO PRESERVE HIS LIEN ON
A DECEDENT'S REAL ESTATE AS PROVIDED FOR BY
SEC. 15(a). OF THE FIDUCIARIES ACT'
"I direct that all my just debts be paid as soon after my decease as possible."
In these words or ones similar in effect, practically every testator incorporates into
his will what he deems an essential element thereof. In many instances, the testator then continues by directing that his real estate be sold or a charge created thereon to take care of his debts. In this note, we shall discuss the effect of such directions on the duration of the lien of debts on a testator's real estate under Sec.
15(a) of the Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 191 7 .2
More specifically, under what circumstances will the provisions of the above
1P. L. 447, 20 PS 521.
21bid.
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act in re the preservation of liens on a decedent's real estate be rendered ineffectual? Prior to the Act of April 19, 1794,3 the debts of a decedent were liens upon
his real estate against all thi world for an indefinite period of time. To remedy
the inconveniences recited in the preamble, the second section of that act limited
the lien of debts, "except they be secured by a mortgage, judgment, recognizance
or other record", to seven years. The Act of February 24, 1834, 4 reduced the
period of the lien of debts to five years, "except they be secured by.a mortgage or
judgment." The Act of June 8, 1893, 5 further reduced the period of lien to two
years which is the same period as provided by the Act of June 14, 1901.6 By Sec.
15(a), of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917, 7 the period now has been further reduced
to one year:
"No debts of a decedent, including the cost of settlement of the
estate and the funeral expenses of the decedent, except as provided
in clauses (b), (g), and (h) hereof, shall remain a lien on the real
estate of such decedent longer than one year after the decease of such
debtor, unless within said period an action for the recovery thereof
be brought against the executor or administrator of such decedent;
and such action shall be indexed, within said period, against the decedent and such executor or administrator, in the judgment index in
the county in which such action is brought, and also in the county in
which the real estate sought to be charged is situate, and be duly
prosecuted to judgment; and then to be a lien only for the period of
five years, unless the same be revived by a writ of scire facias against
the decedent, his heirs, executors, or administrators, and the devisee,
alienee, or owner of the land sought to be charged, in the manner
now provided in the case of the revival of judgments .. ."
Thus we note that the statutory liens of general creditors are for one year
after decedent's death, and where nothing is done to continue them, the real estate
is free thereafter from the enforcement of such claims. This is true even where
the administrator has paid such claims for he stands in no better position than the
original creditor. In Krick's Estate,8 Mr. Justice Stern held that a personal representative, who used her own funds to pay debts of decedent's estate which had
ceased to be liens against the decedent's real estate because of the failure of the
creditors to bring action within the time prescribed by the Fiduciaries Act, is not
entitled to reimbursement out of the proceeds of the sale of the real estate except
to the extent that the personal representative's payment satisfied other existing liens
for which the real estate had remained liable.
It is a well-settled rule in the construction of wills that when the testator
shows an intention to effect an equitable conversion of or an equitable charge on
his real estate, the debts of his general creditors will attach to such real estate even
33 Smith's Laws 143.
4p. L. 73, Sec. 24.

6p. L. 392.

6p. L. 562.

7P. L. 447, 20 PS 521.
8342 Pa. 212, -

A. (2d) -

(1941).
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though they retain no lien thereon as provided for in Sec. 15 (a) of the Fiduciaries
Act.' Where the testator effects a conversion or a charge on his realty, courts of
equity, and the Orphans Court is so regarded, in dealing with the subject will consider it as personalty unless so to consider the real estate will clearly defeat the
intention of the testator. 10
The question arises as to what language the testator may use without effecting
an equitable conversion of his real estate. In some cases, he may order the payment of his debts and the sale of his real estate to pay these debts, or he may direct
payment of his debts and give a naked authority to his executor to sell his real
estate. There are various ways in which an equitable conversion may be effected,
but all the cases are in accord that it is a question of the intention of the testator."
In Reel's Estate12 Mr. Justice Sadler said, "The question of conversion is determined from the will itself".
This intent to convert may be either express or implied. The courts generally
have held that to work a conversion, there must be either: (1) a positive direction
to sell-here the intent is express; or (2) an absolute necessity to sell in order to
execute the will; or (3) such a blending of real and personal estate by the testator
in his will as to clearly show that he intended to create a fund out of both real and
personal estate, and to bequeath the said fund as money. In the latter two instances, an intent to convert is implied. 13 The legislative intent in enacting these
statutes of limitation is clear. It was their purpose to establish repose and certainty
in titles, produce the settlement of estates within a reasonable time, and to free
estates from dormant, slumbering and secret liens. It is for this reason that the
courts require a clear and unequivocal intent to convert. Mr. Justice Gibson had
this in mind, when in Kauffelt v. Bower,14 he said:
"The legislature has uniformly discouraged every other lien or encumbrance than those which arise from transactions which appear
of record, and which, therefore, can prejudice no one who uses
proper diligence to ascertain the proper state of facts, and even
where liens are permitted, it has been thought that the state of property, as well as the habits of the people, required them to be laid
with severe limitations and restrictions."
9

Price's Estate, 26 D. & C. 141 (1936); Zimmerman's Estate, 18 D. & C. 100 (1933); Alexander v. McMurry, 8 Watts 504 (1839) ; Steel v. Henry, 9 Watts 523 (1840) ; Reel's Estate, Foreman's Appeal, 272 Pa. 135, 116 A. 107 (1922)

; Seitzinger's Estate, Potteiger's Estate, 170 Pa. 531,

32 A. 1101 (1895); Appeal of City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. 470, 4 A. 4 (1886); McWilliam's
Appeal, 117 Pa. 111, 11 A. 383 (1887).

10jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. 42 (1881); Alexander v. McMurry, 8 Watts 504 (1839).
IlReel's Estate, ForemanIs Appeal, 272 Pa. 135, 116 A. 107 (1922) ; Davidson v. Bright, 267
Pa. 580, 110 A. 301 (1920); Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa. 84 (1863); Pullinger's Estate, 48 Pa. Super.
630 (1912).
2
1 See note 11.
13Davidson v. Bright, 267 Pa. 580, 110 A. 301 (1920) ; Lamberton's Estate, 40 Pa. Super. 548
(1909); Reel's Estate, 272 Pa. 135, 116 A. 107 (1922) ; Hunt's and Lehman's Appeals, 105 P4. 128
(1884); Darlington v. Darlington, 160 Pa. 65, 28 A. 503 (1894); Chamberlain's Estate, 257 Pa.
113, 101 A. 314 (1917).
147 S. & R. 64 at 73 (1821).
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In directing a sale of the real estate, there must be an 'expression in some
form of an absolute intention that the land shall be sold and turned into money,
as by the use of mandatory words directing the sale, or by the giving of the power
of sale in imperative terms. 15 Thus in Price's Estate,16 the court held that where
the testator directs his executor to pay all his just debts and also to sell any real
estate of which he may die possessed, there was an equitable conversion, and the
proceeds of the sale of the decedent's real estate were subject to claims of creditors
even though the property was not sold until more than one year after decedent's
death, and the creditors had retained no lien th'ereon under the provisions of Sec.
15 (a) of the Fiduciaries Act.
In Alexander v. McMurry, 17 the facts were these: E. B., testator, after devising a portion of his estate, thus disposed of the residue: "All the residue of my
estate, real and personal, I order to be sold by my executors, and I empower them
to convey the same in fee simple. All the moneys arising from such sales, I do
give and devise to be equally divided between my two sons, J. and R., my just
debts being first paid". J. and R. were the executors of the will. Plaintiff bought
the land at a sheriff's sale on a judgment of W.M., a creditor of the testator. Defendant bought the land at a sheriff's sale on a judgment of J.B., a creditor of J.
The court held that there was not such an estate in the residue of the lands vested
in the said J. and R. as was the subject of levy and sale for the payment of their
individual debts, until the debts of the testator were first paid. It was contended
that the creditor of the testator had no lien because of his failure to preserve the
same as required by statute. The court answered this by holding that a devise of
land to executors to be sold for the payment of debts vests the estate in th'em as a
trust fund for that purpose, and if they neglect to execute the trust, the creditors
may sell the land upon a judgment and execution, and the purchaser will take good
title; and in such case, there is no limit to the lien of debts short of the presumption of payment from lapse of time.1 8
It is vital to effect a conversion that the direction to sell should be positive,
irrespective of contingencies and independent of discretion.' 9 Thus in Anewalt's
Appeal,20 a testator by his will directed that when his son "0" became of legal
age, appraisers were to b'e chosen to value the homestead farm, of which the son
was to have the valuation if he chose; if he refused, the executors were to sell the
farm. Mr. Justice Thompson said: "As the directions of the testator in the will to
sell were not absolute, but contingent and subject to the discretion of one or more,
there was no conversion"."
15Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa. 84 (1863); Jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. 42 (1881).
1626 D. & C. 141 (1936).
178 Watts 504 (1839).
ISeitzinger's Estate, 170 Pa. 531, 32 A. 1101 (1895); Steelv.Henry, 9 Watts 523 (1840).
19Neely v. Grantham, 58 Pa. 433 (1868); Davidson v. Bright, 267 Pa. 580, 110 A. 301
(1920) ; Stoner v. Zimmerman, 21 Pa. 394 (1853).
2042 Pa. 414 (1862).

21See Peterson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 397 (1879).
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As before noted, an intent to convert will be implied where there is an absolute necessity to sell in order to execute the will.22 In In re Gruner's Estate,23 the
testator after directing the payment of his debts, bequeathed a niece two legacies
and all his personal property. He then disposed of the residue of his estate, consisting of realty, and directed his executors to sell the realty and divide the residue
among the children of a deceased brother. The court held that there was a necessity to sell in order to execute the will, working an immediate conversion at the
24
testator's death, and all his estate passed as personalty. In In re Severn's Estate,
the court said that if the purpose of the testator be impossible to carry out without
a sale, the fact that the power to sell is, in form, discretionary, is not material on
the question of conversion. Likewise, where from the provisions of the will,
there is a manifest intention, express or plainly implied, to create from blended
realty and personalty, a fund in money for the purpose of distribution, there is an
equitable conversion. 25 In Bahn's Estate,26 the testatrix had directed that her
husband and her daughter "shall occupy my house and lot until such time as my
husband and my executor shall agree to sell the same, and when so sold that the
proceeds of said sale shall be equally divided between my husband and my daughter", and also authorized her executor "to make as good a title of my real estate
sold as I could were I living." Mr. Judge Porter held that this showed a clear intent that the land should be sold and the proceeds divided and therefore effected a
conversion of the real estate.
The intention may be implied, however, only where the design and purpose
of the testator is unequivocal, and the implication so strong as to leave no substantial doubt, for equity will never presume a conversion, unless it is demanded to
accomplish the lawful purposes expressed in the will of the testator. 27 Where the
intention of the testator cannot be carried out, the purpose of the direction fails,
and the estate vests as though no such intent had been manifested. In Pullinger's
Estate,28 the testator by his will directed a sale of his real estate for the specific
purpose of producing a fund to pay charitable bequests. As the will was not duly
witnessed under the terms of the Act of April 26, 1855,29 the bequests to the charities were void. It was decided that the direction to sell was merely for the convenience of distribution and was not for the purpose of creating a fund to be distributed as personalty; therefore, there was no conversion.
Where there is an imperative direction to sell, unless the will provides in
terms that the sale shall be made at some specified future time or creates a trust
22Hunt's and Lehman's Appeals, 105 Pa. 128 (1884).
28269 Pa. 573, 112 A. 753 (1921).
24211 Pa. 65, 60 A. 492 (1905).
25
Marshall's Estate, 147 Pa. 77, 23 A. 391 (1892).
2657 Pa. Super. 457 (1914).
2
Yerkes v. Yerkes, 200 Pa. 419, 50 A. 186 (1901); Lamberton's Estate, 40 Pa. Super. 549
(1909) ; Sauerbier's Estate, 202 Pa. 187, 51 A. 751 (1902).
2848 Pa. Super. 630 (1912).
29p. L. 328, sec. 11, 10 PS 12.
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with direction to sell only on the happening of a designated event which may or
may not happen; where there is an absolute necessity to sell in order to execute the
'will; or where there is a blending of the realty and personalty, the general rule is
that the conversion will be deemed to take place as of the date of the testator's
death.3 0
As a general rule, the courts refuse to find an intent to convert where the
act of selling or converting is left to the discretion or choice of the executor, and
there is no positive direction for him to do so. In this case, the property remains
in its original condition, and there is no conversion until the power is actually exercised.1
In Perot'sAppeal,"2 the testator after creating a trust in favor of his wife and
children, directed: "I further authorize and empower my executors to make sale,
in their discretion, of any real estate for the purposes of this trust." Mr. Justice
Penrose held there was no conversion of the testator's real estate since there was
no manifested intention by the testator to effect such a conversion.
In Davidson v. Bright," Mr. Justice Kephart held that a direction "to pay all
my just debts and funeral expenses", and an authority to the executors "to make
sale of any of my real estate", do not work an equitable conversion and vest the
entire estate as personalty, where there is nothing in the will upon which could be
predicated a positive direction to sell or a necessity to sell in order to execute the
will, nor such a blending of real and personal property as would create a fund to
devolve as personalty.
In Seeds v. Burk," where the testatrix directed her executor to pay all her
just debts, and then created a trust and authorized the trustee to sell her real estate,
the court held that there was no absolute direction to sell and therefore no conversion.
The courts have not agreed always as to what effects a conversion. In Steel v.
Henry, 5 there was no absolute direction to sell the real estate, yt the court held
that a charge of the debts had been created on the real estate. Here, the testator
provided as follows: "I give to my wife all my personal estate, and in case the
whole or any part of it should be sold for debts, she is to be reimbursed out of
my real estate. I give to my executors full power and authority to collect all debts
due me, and to sell the whole or any part of my real estate, for the purpose of
paying all my just debts, and of carrying into effect the provisions of this will"
Mr. Justice Kennedy said:
"The testator charged by his will the debt in question, as also other
debts, upon his real estate, and in case his personal estate should be
'OBrolaskey v. Gally's Executors, 51 Pa. 509 (1866) ; Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa. 84 (1863).
SlPeterson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 397 (1879).
32102 Pa. 235 (1883).
3267 Pa. 580, 110 A. 301 (1920).
'4181 Pa. 281, 37 A. 511 (1897).
859 Watts 523 (1840).
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insufficient to meet the payment of them, ht also directs that his
executors shall sell his real estate, and out of the moneys arising
therefrom, first pay all his debts still remaining unpaid; the authority, moreover, given to the executors to sell the real estate, and with
the proceeds thereof to pay the debts in the first place, created a trust
which they were boundto exercise and discharge according to the
tenor and effect of the will."
In the Appeal of City of Philadelphia, Trustee, &c., of 1. M. Eister,36 the
testator in his will said: "I desire all my other estate, real, personal or mixed,
shall, as soon after my decease as practicable, be sold, and the proceeds arising
therefrom be invested in first bonds and mortgages". Mr. Justice Paxson held
that the above language in the will worked a conversion of the testator's real
estate. At page 474 of the opinion, he says:
"We regard this as a direction to sell; the words 'I desire' are the
equivalent of the words 'I will' that my real estate shall be sold,
while the added words, 'as soon after my decease as practicable', left
no discretion to the executors excepting as to the matter of time."
The very recent case of Krick's Estate37 removes all doubt in Pennsylvania as
to the effect of a direction to pay debts coupled with a power to sell the real
estate. In this case, the testator in his will directed that all his debts should be
paid as soon as convenient after his decease; he left his property to his wife for
life. "with the power ... to sell and make conveyance of real and personal property, to invest the proceeds, etc." The wife was appointed executrix of his will,
but during the following nineteen years, she filed no account. Upon an audit, it
was found that the estate was indebted to the executrix in the sum of $50,308.05
for expenditures made by her out of her personal funds to pay the debts of his
estate. Two years after the death of the testator, his executrix had sold his Penn
Street property and taken a bond and mortgage in the sum of $50,000 payable to
her as executrix which at her death she had in her possession. The question to be
decided was whether her claim could be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the
Penn Street property. It was urged by the appellee that the will effected a conversion of his real estate as of the time of his death, and, therefore, the Penn
Street property was at all times personalty and subject to the payment of the debts
of the estate. After stating that a personal represenative stands in no better position than a creditor of the estate, Mr. Justice Stern held that "the mere direction
by the testator to pay debts, accompanied by a power of sale of his realty, does not
effect a conversion; the order to pay debts added nothing to what the law itself
38
would have insisted upon."
It must be noted that where the testator creates a charge of debts upon his
real estate or a trust of that real estate for the payment of his debts, his unsecured
creditors need not preserve their liens as required by Sec. 15 (a) of the Fiduciaries
36112 Pa. 470, 4 A. 4 (1886).
37342
Pa. 212, A. (2d) (1941).
38
See Mayer's Estate, 289 Pa. 407, 137 A. 627 (1927).
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Act. 39 In Appeal of Th'onpson,4" the testator in his will provided as follows:
"And to my son C, I give all the balance of my estate, for which bequest, I order
that he, the said C, shall pay all my just debts, funeral expenses, and the charges
of settling up my estate." The court hld that the debts of the testator were a
charge upon the land devised to C.
As in the question of a conversion, the creation of a charge on a decedent's
real estate is to be determined from the intention of the testator. In Shaffer's
Estate,4 t the court said, "no particular language is necessary to create a charge on
land, and the intention to charge is to be carried out whenever it is discoverable
from anything in the instrument." It has been held that a mere direction by a
testator that the dvisee shall pay a legacy or a debt does not create a charge on
the land; there must be express words or necessary implication from the whole
42
will that such was the intention.
It is not always easy to determine whether the testator has created a charge or
a trust for the payment of his debts. Mr. Scott distinguishes the two in the following manner:
"An equitable charge, like a trust, can be created by a transfer of
property inter vivos, as well as by will, and the property subject
charge
thereto may be personal as well as real property; an equitable
43
may be created for the payment of debts or legacies.
"Whether an equitable charge or a trust is created depends upon the
manifestation of the transferor. If the intention is to impose a duty
upon the transferee to deal with the property for the benefit of a
third person, and to give the third oerson the beneficial interest in
the property, a trust is created; if the intention is to give the beneficialinterest to the tranferee and merely to give a security interest
to the third person, an equitable charge is created. If the testator
devises land and directs the devisee to sell the land and pay the proceeds or a part of the proceeds! to a third person, a trust is created.
On the other hand, if the testator devises land 'subject to the payment of' a certain sum to a third person, or 'he paying' a certain sum
to a third person, an equitable charge and not a trust is created. The
matter is brought out well in Jacquet v. Jacquet, 27 Beav. 332
(1859); in that case, a testator had two plantations in Jamaica; one
of these he directed his executors to sell and with the proceeds to
pay his debts. He devised the other 'subject to the payment of' his
debts and certain legacies. It was held that a trust was created as to
the first plantation, but that an equitable charge was created on the
second plantation."
39Seitzinger's Bstate, 170 Pa. 531, 32 A. 1101 (1895); Steel v. Henry, 9 Watts 523 (1940)
Pyles, Ex'r'x., v. Bosler, Ex'r'x., 313 Pa. 548, 170 A. 897 (1934).
407 Sadler 222, 11 A. 455 (1887).
41262 Pa. 15, 104 A. 853 (1918).
42
Alexander v. McMurrv. 8 Watts 504 (1839); Hackadorn's Appeal, It Pa. 86 (1849)
Cable's Appeal, 91 Pa. 327 (1879).
43THE LAW OF TRUSTS, A. W. Scott, vol. 1, sec. 10.3.
441d. sec. 10.6.
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"If a testator devises or bequeaths property subject to the payment
of certain sums of money to third persons, he thereby creates an
equitable charge. An equitable charge is like a trust in that in each
case the legal title to property is vested in one person and an equitable interest in the property is given to another. The equitable encumbrancer, however, has a mere security interest in the property,
and his remedy is a suit in equity to obtain a decree for the sale of
the land to pay his charge."45
In Trinity Church v. Watson, 6 the provisions of the testator's will were as
follows: "I direct that all my debts and funeral expenses be paid as soon after my
decease as possible. To pay the debts, I desire that all my personal property that
my wife shall be willing to part with (and no more) be sold, and if more money
be needed, that so much of my real estate as might be thought expedient be sold,
as will raise the money to pay my debts." He then gave his property to his wife
for life and on her death, he bequeathed the property or what may remain after
his debts were paid to the Trinity Church. The court held that a general charge
on the real estate by devise for the payment of debts did not create a testamentary
lien of unlimited duration; however, as to the creditors set forth in the testator's
will, the court held their liens to be unlimited. The court distinguished between
a devise for specific debts and one generally for creditors, saying that the former
are equivalent to legacies charged on the land, who being thus known and recognized by the testator, stand in no need of proof of their debts, while one who
claims but as belonging to a class is neither known nor recognized even by the will
except upon proof that he belongs to the class; his case is clearly adversary until
he has maintained his right to seat himself upon the trust; he falls within the mischief the Act of 183447 intended to remedy and should be governed by its terms
which literally include him.
In Huntington v. Minard,48 the testatrix directed that the expenses of her
last illness and funeral expenses and all her just debts be paid as soon after her
decease as possible. It was contended that because of this provision and the fact
that the testatrix left no personal estate, it must be presumed that there should be
a sale of the real estate for the purpose of paying the debts and, therefore, the
statutory limitation on the lien of debts did not apply. The court held that the
lien of the debts had expired, citing Alexander v. McMurry,46 Steel v. Henry50
and Trinity Church v. Walson.51 It distinguished the instant case, saying that the
first two cases were clearly distinguishable from the case at bar since in them there
was an express direction to sell the real estate of the testator which made the debts
a charge on the land, and a trust fund was created out of the proceeds of the sale
451d. sec. 10.

4650 Pa. 518 (1865).
47p. L. 73.
48Huntington v. Minard, 19 D. & C. 458 (1933).
498 Watts 504 (1839).
509 Watts 523 (1840).

5150 Pa. 518 (1865).
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for the purpose of paying the debts; whereas, in the case at bar, there was no manifested intent to make the debts a charge on the real estate. Trinity Church v. Watson was distinguished on the ground that in the case at bar, there was no devise
for the payment of debts; nor were any of the creditors specified, but only a class
2
of expenses, without designation of the creditors.1
Pyles, Ex'r'x., v. Bosler, Ex'r'x.,58 is an interesting case in regard to the crea-

tion of a charge on real estate. In this case, the purpose of the litigation was to
charge the real estate left by defendant's testator, Frank C. Bosler, with the lien of
a debt alleged to have been due by him to plaintiff's testator, H. W. Pyles. The
question involved was whether the lien had been kept alive as prescribed by Sec.
15(a) of the Fiduciaries Act."5 It was urged by the appellee that the lien on decedent's real estate was preserved because of a provision of Bosler's will which was
as follows: "All the balance of my estate of every kind and nature" (which included the land herein sought to be charged), "I give, devise and bequeath to my
wife.. . . Payment of almost all my obligations is provided for by life insurance
policies ....
55
estate."

All not so provided for are to be paid by my executors out of my

Mr. Justice Simpson held that the creditor had met all the requirements of
Sec. 15(a) of the Fiduciaries Act, and that the court could not consider the effect
of the will as this was a matter not raised in the court below. He, however,
added this dictum:
"Doubtless, under that provision of the will, plaintiff could have
proceeded in the Orphan s Court, at a much less expenditure of time
and money than the present proceedings must have caused. She
could thereby have forced,
if necessary, a sale of the land thus
charged with the debt." 6
SUMMARY

Sec, 15(a) of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 requires that unsecured creditors
in order to preserve their liens on a decedent's real estate for a period longer than
one year must fulfill the statutory requirements. There are certain recognized
exceptions to this statutory provision, namely: that where the testator has effected
an equitable conversion of or created an equitable charge upon his real estate, the
liens of unsecured creditors will continue for an indefinite period of time subject
only to the presumption of payment from lapse of time. Both a conversion and
a charge are based on the intent of the testator as manifested in his will. To effect
a conversion, there must be a positive direction to sell the real estate, an absolute
52 See Reel's Estate, Foreman's Appeal, 272 Pa. 135, 116 A. 107 (1922).
58313 Pa. 548, 170 A. 897 (1934).
54P.
L.447, 20 PS 521.
5
S56
Italics
added.
1n speaking of the proceedings in the Orphan's Court, Mr. Justice
Simpson no doubt was
referring
tothe Act of June 7,1917, P.L. 447, sec.
25(a), 20 PS 652.
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necessity to sell in order to execute the will, or such a blending of real and personal estate as shows an intent on the part of the testator to create a fund to devolve as personalty.
The latest authority in Pennsylvania 7 has settled definitely the question that
a mere direction by the testator to pay his debts accompanied by a power of sale
of his realty does not effect a conversion, on the theory that the order to pay debts
adds nothing to what the law itself would have insisted upon. Therefore, since
the law provides a procedure for the payment of debts, it is the firm conviction of
this writer that he is a wise testator who says nothing about th payment of debts
in his will.
WILLIAM

57

Krick's Estate, 342 Pa. 212, -

A. (2d)

-

(1941).
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